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Decelerated invasion and waning moon patterns in public goods games with delayed distribution
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We study the evolution of cooperation in the spatial public goods game, focusing on the effects that are
brought about by the delayed distribution of goods that accumulate in groups due to the continuous investments
of cooperators. We find that intermediate delays enhance network reciprocity because of a decelerated invasion
of defectors, who are unable to reap the same high short-term benefits as they do in the absence of delayed
distribution. Long delays, however, introduce a risk because the large accumulated wealth might fall into the
wrong hands. Indeed, as soon as the curvature of a cooperative cluster turns negative, the engulfed defectors
can collect the heritage of many generations of cooperators, and by doing so start a waning moon pattern that
nullifies the benefits of decelerated invasion. Accidental meeting points of growing cooperative clusters may
also act as triggers for the waning moon effect, thus linking the success of cooperators with their propensity to
fail in a rather bizarre way. Our results highlight that “investing into the future” is a good idea only if that future
is sufficiently near and not likely to be burdened by inflation.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Fb, 87.23.Ge, 87.23.Kg
Large segments of our economy rely on continuous invest-
ments into a common pool that, at least so we are told, will or
are very likely to pay off sometime in the future. Retirement
plans and investments into the public health care and educa-
tion system fall under this category, while somewhat shorter-
term examples might include investing some fraction of per-
sonal wealth into a startup business or becoming a shareholder
of a company with bright prospects. Either way, more often
than not, the payoff from an investment is likely not going to
be immediate, but rather it will set in with a delay.
The public goods game [1] captures the essential social
dilemma that is linked with investments into a common pool.
Those that contribute are cooperators, while those that do not
are defectors. All the contributions within a group are mul-
tiplied to take into account synergetic effects of cooperation,
and the resulting amount is divided equally among all group
members irrespective of their strategies. If nobody invests, the
group fails to harvest the benefits of a collective investment,
and the society may evolve towards the “tragedy of the com-
mons” [2]. Recently identified ways of avoiding this include
the introduction of volunteering [3], social diversity [4], bipar-
titeness [5, 6], random exploration of strategies [7], repeated
group interactions [8], the risk of collective failures [9], selec-
tion pressure [10], conditional strategies [11], rare malicious
agents [12], as well as multiplexity [13–16].
The game in its traditional form, however, does not take
into account delays that might occur before the investments
can actually be capitalized upon. Taking such delays into ac-
count essentially means altering the time scales of evolution-
ary dynamics [17–19]. Previous research showed that the di-
versity in reproduction time scales [20] and the coevolution
of time scales [21] both promote cooperation. Indirect ways
of altering the time scales, for example by means of break-
ing the symmetry between interaction and replacement [22],
wealth accumulation [23], consideration of long-term bene-
fits [24], or other coevolutionary processes [25–27], have also
been noted as beneficial for resolving social dilemmas. The
application of a delayed distribution of accumulating goods,
however, cannot be considered as a simple separation of time
scales between learning (strategy adoption) and interaction
(payoff accumulation) processes, because cooperators, as we
will see, loose their payoff permanently between two consec-
utive distributions, while the effective payoff of defectors re-
mains unchanged.
Here we therefore study the evolution of cooperation in the
public goods game on the square lattice [28], whereon ini-
tially each player on site x is designated either as a cooperator
(si = C) or defector (si = D) with equal probability. Re-
gardless of their strategies, players receive a return on their
investments from five overlapping groups of size G = 5 [29],
but they do so only after each τ -th round of the game. The
payoff to each player stemming from a particular group is
then r
∑
i,k ci,k/G, where the sum runs over all the players
within a group (i = 1 . . .G) and over τ rounds of the game
(k = 1 . . . τ ), and ci,k is the contribution of player i to the
common pool during the k-th round. Without loss of gener-
ality cooperators contribute 1 during each round of the game
while defectors contribute nothing.
Unlike the distribution of public goods, the strategy trans-
fers between randomly selected neighbors are possible during
each round of the game, and they proceed according to the
probability w = (1 + exp[(Pi − Pj)/K])−1, where K = 0.5
determines the uncertainty by strategy adoptions [29]. To take
properly into account the seasonality that is introduced due
to the delayed distribution of accumulating goods, the pay-
offs Pi entering the Fermi function w are averaged over the
last τ rounds of the game. Note that this is necessary because
the impact of each newly acquired payoff should last until the
next distribution. During each full Monte Carlo step (MCS)
all players will have a chance to pass their strategy once on
average. We have used the square lattice having L = 200 to
4800 linear size and up to 106 MCS before determining the
fraction of cooperators fC within the whole population. Since
the model is very simple, introducing only a single additional
parameter τ to the game, the results should not be seen as de-
scribing a particular situation, but rather outline general con-
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FIG. 1: Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the multipli-
cation factor r for different values of the distribution delay τ , as
indicated in the figure legend. The positive trend for small and in-
termediate delays reverses when long delays are applied.
sequences that may set in due to delayed distributions in the
realm of collective social dilemmas.
Figure 1 shows how delays in distribution affect the evo-
lution of public cooperation. It can be observed that short
and intermediate delays significantly lower the minimally re-
quired multiplication factor r that is needed for cooperators to
survive and to dominate in the population. By comparing the
results for τ = 11 and 20, however, we find that the trend re-
verses, affecting particularly strong the threshold for cooper-
ator dominance. For τ = 50 cooperators are no longer able to
eliminate defectors within the r ≤ G limit, while the thresh-
old value of r for the survival of cooperators raises back to the
rc value recorded at τ = 1.
The non-monotonous impact of delays in the distribution of
public goods is depicted in Fig. 2, where the bell shaped out-
lay of the fC versus τ dependence indicates two competing
effects affecting the evolution of cooperation. On the up side,
delays help cooperators because they prevent defectors to uti-
lize a temporarily high payoff via a fast invasion. Although
cooperators are also negatively affected by the delays because
they are unable to capitalize immediately on their investments,
defectors are ultimately the ones who suffer more from the de-
celerated invasions capabilities. We emphasize that the inva-
sion of cooperators is always slower because it needs a collec-
tive effort, and hence the slow down of the speed of invasions
effectively enhances network reciprocity. Qualitatively simi-
lar observations were made in [30], where a less aggressive
punishment strategy outperformed rewarding, in [31], where
the reduced speed of invasion due to aging affected defectors
more adversely than cooperators, as well as in [13], where the
suppressed feedback of individual success due to biased util-
ity functions lead to a spontaneous separation of characteris-
tic time scales of the evolutionary process on interdependent
networks. From a different point of view, the described mech-
anism can also be interpreted as a “memory effect” (referring
to the memory of preceding payoffs, not strategies), because a
defector cannot utilize its potentially high current payoff due
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FIG. 2: Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the distribution
delay τ for r = 3.6. An optimal value of τ provides the best condi-
tions for the evolution of cooperation. Inset shows results obtained
for K = 0.1, 0.5 and 0.8, from left to right.
to preceding smaller payoffs, hence precluding a fast invasion.
In general, cooperation is promoted because the aggressive in-
vasion of defectors is more sensitive to the slowing-down than
the build-up of collective efforts in sizable groups.
While the up side of delays for the evolution of public coop-
eration is rooted in decelerated invasion, the down side man-
ifests in a more subtle manner. Spatial patterns presented in
Fig. 3 provide vital insights. Even for low values of r, coop-
erative clusters are able to grow in the sea of defectors due
to enhanced network reciprocity [panels (a) and (b)], as de-
scribed above. Due to uncertainties in the strategy adoption,
however, the front separating cooperators and defectors is not
completely sharp, and it may happen that somewhere the cur-
vature becomes negative. As panels (c) – (f) illustrate, this be-
comes the entry point for defectors to invade. A characteristic
waning moon pattern emerges, and accordingly we dub this
the waning moon effect, which is intimately related with the
delayed distribution of accumulating public goods. Namely,
as soon as the curvature becomes negative, a lucky defector
becomes surrounded by cooperators, and as such is scheduled
to receive a huge payoff that is due to the preceding collab-
orative efforts. In fact, it is about to receive the heritage of
many generations of cooperators, and this will have a posi-
tive impact on its payoff also in the following τ rounds of the
game, despite the fact that the neighborhood will gradually
turn defective. Ironically, the high payoff should have gone to
a cooperator that contributed previously, but had turned defec-
tor before the distribution round. The lucky defector will also
have an evolutionary advantage over neighboring cooperators,
because the latter will continue to contribute to the common
pool. Although due to enhanced network reciprocity cooper-
ators may continue to spread at the other side of the moon,
their propagation speed will be lower than the invasion of de-
fectors, ultimately resulting in the waning moon pattern. The
only chance for cooperators not to disappear entirely is if a
small fraction of the previous homogeneous domain remains
bounded by a front with positive curvature, at which point the
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FIG. 3: The waning moon effect, emerging spontaneously on a grow-
ing cooperative cluster (blue), as observed at τ = 50 and r = 3.65.
The cluster grows until its border has positive curvature [panels (a)
and (b)]. As soon as the curvature becomes negative [panel (c)],
which happens by chance due to the fluctuations along the expand-
ing interface, defectors (red) can invade the bulk of the cluster. The
cluster keeps growing on the other end, but the invasion of defec-
tors is faster, resulting in the “waning moon” pattern. The total area
occupied by cooperators decreases until somewhere again a small
cooperative cluster with positive curvature around the entire border
emerges (not shown). From that point onwards the whole cycle starts
anew. Snapshots of the 200 × 200 square lattice in panels (b) – (f)
were taken 200, 250, 300, 350 and 600 MCS after panel (a).
whole process starts again. It is worth mentioning that the
emergence of the waning moon pattern is a nice example of
when the movement of a front separating two homogeneous
phases depends sensitively on the sign of the curvature.
Besides the spontaneous emergence of negative curvature
due to fluctuations in the cooperative front, the latter also ap-
pears whenever two growing domains meet, as illustrated in
Fig. 4. Due to the same reasons as described above, this will
open the gate for the invasion of defectors [panels (d) and (e)],
and again the only hope for cooperators is the emergence of
smaller homogenous clusters with overall positive curvature
[panel (f)]. Since the successful growth of cooperative clus-
ters is thus inseparably linked with their failure in an intricate
and quite bizarre turn of events involving large-scale spatial
patterns, it is important to use sufficiently large system size
L. This lowers the amplitude of fluctuations of fC , firstly
because then the growth and decline of cooperative cluster is
unlikely to be synchronized in time, but also because more
frequent collisions prevent the emergence of extreme, nearly
homogeneous states. Regardless of what triggers the waning
moon effect, it is straightforward to see that both the prob-
ability as well as the severity of such an event increase as
we increase τ . Accordingly, larger τ gradually drown out the
positive effects stemming from enhanced network reciprocity
by evoking the waning moon effect more frequently and in a
more potent form, in turn giving rise to the bell-shaped de-
pendence depicted in Fig. 2. Evidently, these phenomena are
rooted in pattern formation on structured populations, and as
such can not emerge in well-mixed systems.
Since long-term investments are frequently subject to infla-
tion, it remains of interest to determine their impact on the
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FIG. 4: Growing cooperative clusters [panels (a), (b) and (c)] may
collide, naturally giving rise to interfaces with negative curvature
[panel (d)], and thus triggering the waning moon effect. Defectors
are therefore able to invade [panel (e)], until small cooperative clus-
ters re-emerge and start growing again [panel (f)]. The borders of
these clusters will collide anew and so the process is repeated. Note
that initially the cooperative cluster actually collides with itself due
to periodic boundary conditions. We have intentionally applied a
small system size for clarity, although of course the same collapse
of independently growing domains can be observed for larger L as
well. Parameters are the same as in Fig. 3, and panels (b) – (f) were
taken 550, 1250, 1800, 2020 and 2630 MCS after panel (a).
described evolutionary dynamics. To do so, we assume that
some fraction of accumulating public goods gets lost between
two consecutive distribution events. Thus, the longer the de-
lay, the larger the fraction that is lost. Technically this can be
accommodated by multiplying the accumulated public goods
with a factor qτ before each distribution, where q < 1 char-
acterizes the rate of inflation. Although this seems to work
against the success of long-term investments, we note that it
may also weaken the waning moon effect because defectors
will inevitably inherit a smaller amount than in the absence of
inflation. Evidently, the value of q should not be too small (in-
flation too large), as this may erase all earnings and preclude
the observation of interesting collective behavior. For exam-
ple, loosing 1% (q = 0.99) at every round sounds bearable,
yet each group will have lost 40% of the accumulated goods
when reaching τ = 50. We thus use q = 0.99, but note that
similar behavior can be observed also when using larger in-
flation rates within reasonable bounds. As depicted in Fig. 5,
the bell-shaped dependence of fC on τ survives, and with it
thus also enhanced network reciprocity and the waning moon
effect. In particular, it is still beneficial to accumulate public
goods for a while before distribution (fC = 0 if τ ≤ 3), al-
though the inflation will lower the maximally attainable level
of public cooperation under the same conditions, as well as
narrow the window where the enhanced network reciprocity
due to decelerated invasion can offset the looming waning
moon effect (compare with Fig. 2).
In sum, we have studied the evolution of cooperation in the
spatial public goods games on the square lattice, focusing in
particular on revealing the impact of delayed distribution of
continuously accumulating goods. Motivated by actual ex-
perience, indicating that the payoffs from investments often
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FIG. 5: Fraction of cooperators fC in dependence on the distribution
delay τ for r = 3.6 and inflation q = 0.99 (see main text for details).
Cooperators do not survive if τ ≤ 3 and fare optimally at τ = 8.
Note also that due to inflation the overall maximum is lower and the
bell narrower than in Fig. 2 (without inflation).
come with a delay, we find that intermediate delays actually
can promote the evolution of public cooperation. The posi-
tive effect is due to a decelerated invasion, which strength-
ens network reciprocity. Interestingly, delays in distribution
adversely affect the invasion speed of both strategies. Coop-
erators are unable to benefit from the collective investment
immediately despite continuously paying the price for it, yet
the defectors are also unable to exploit them continuously be-
cause of that. Defectors are ultimately those who suffer more
from their decelerated invasion capabilities, as they are unable
to gain the high short-term benefits that would allow them to
invade in the absence of delays. As the delays grow, however,
not just the accumulated wealth becomes larger, but also the
probability that it will fall into the hands of defectors. We have
dubbed the phenomenon the waning moon effect because of
the characteristic shape of the vanishing cooperative clusters
it introduces. The effect is triggered by negative curvatures
of the interfaces separating cooperators and defectors, which
may occur either because of random fluctuations along the
invasion front or because of collision of two or more grow-
ing cooperative clusters. Defectors effectively become sur-
rounded by cooperators that may have till then accumulated
a large wealth. When distribution time comes, defectors are
simply handed down the heritage from generations of cooper-
ators, which nullifies the positive effects of enhanced network
reciprocity. The larger the delays, the more likely and the
more devastating the waning moon effect is going to be, until
essentially all the benefits from delayed distribution vanish.
We have also shown that inflation acting on the accumulat-
ing contributions narrows the interval of optimal delays, and
in fact strongly jeopardizes the potential success of long-term
investments. We conclude that the latter are likely to yield
the desired income if “investing into the future” refers to the
future near by.
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